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ACTIONS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER: HOLDER'S 
PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES UNDER 
ARTICLE THREE 
Stanley V. Kinyon* 
MANY lawyers, even experienced trial lawyers, either are not aware of the special procedural provisions in Articles Three 
and Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code1 (Code), or else do not 
fully understand their significance. These provisions are derived 
from several sections of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law2 
(NIL) and afford a claimant in an action on a negotiable instrument3 
significant procedural advantages as compared with a claimant in an 
ordinary action for breach of contract. As a result of their lack of 
awareness or understanding, counsel sometimes fail to obtain for 
their clients the full procedural benefits incident to the holdership 
of negotiable paper. 
Perhaps this unawareness of these procedural provisions exists 
because they have been tucked away inconspicuously among the mass 
of substantive law in the NIL and the Code. They do not appear in 
most procedural codes or rules of civil procedure and they tend to 
be neglected in the study of procedure in addition to being brushed 
aside by writers and teachers of negotiable instruments law as "mere 
• Professor of Law, University of Minnesota . .B.A. 1931, LL.B. 1933, University of 
Minnesota.-Ed. 
The author's field of specialization is commercial and contract law, not procedure. 
Since discussion of the special procedural rules in Article Three of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] necessarily involves some aspects of non-Code 
procedural law, wisdom suggested counsel from someone learned in that area, and the 
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful information, criticism, and suggestions gen-
erously furnished by his Minnesota colleague, Professor James L. Hetland, Jr. All blame 
for inadequacies in the article, of course, rests with the author. 
I. The principal provisions are in §§ 3-307 & 8-105(2). Section 3-307 is quoted in the 
text following note 55 infra. All Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text and Com-
ments. 
2. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW§§ 11, 16, 24, 28, 45, 46 & 59, discussed in 
notes 36-38 infra and accompanying text. [Hereinafter cited as N.I.L.] 
3. Normally the claimant in an action on a negotiable instrument-to enforce or 
recover for breach of the obligations of the signer-will be the holder of the instrument, 
since the obligations of the instrument, by its terms (or indorsements, if any), are per-
formable to the holder. The term "holder" as used throughout the Code is defined in 
§ 1-201(20) as "a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument or 
an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer 
or in blank." Occasionally, the claimant in such an action may be a remitter who has 
purchased but not delivered an instrument payable to another, or a transferee who has 
acquired the rights of the holder without an indorsement necessary to his own holder-
ship. See U.C.C. §§ 3-201 & 8-301. Such claimants, by establishing the basis of their 
claim, may be entitled to the procedural advantages of§§ 3-307 & 8-105(2). See comment 
2 to U.C.C. § 3-307. 
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matters of procedure." Or it may be simply that actions on nego-
tiable instruments do not comprise a significant portion of the 
average lawyer's litigation practice. At any rate, the importance of 
the procedural provisions when such actions do arise, is sufficient to 
justify some discussion and analysis. 
Unlike the NIL, which purportedly governed all negotiable 
instruments, the Code deals separately with different classes of 
negotiable paper. Thus, Article Three is restricted4 to commercial 
paper: checks and other drafts, promissory notes (other than bonds), 
and promissory certificates of deposit.5 Article Eight deals with 
bonds, stocks, and other forms of investment securities6 and is essen-
tially a new "negotiable instruments law,"7 tailored to the functions 
of such paper. A number of Article Eight's provisions,8 like those 
in section 8-105(2), which parallels section 3-307, are very similar to 
counterpart provisions in Article Three, since both are in part de-
rived from the NIL. To avoid confusion it seems expedient to con-
fine this discussion mainly to actions on Article Three instruments 
and to the provisions of section 3-307. Nevertheless, by virtue of 
section 8-105(2), much of what is said will be applicable to actions 
by holders of investment securities against the issuers and other 
obligors. 
The discussion will also be concerned primarily with the usual 
action "on the instrument": an action by the holder to enforce pay-
ment by a person who has signed it as maker, acceptor, certifier, 
drawer, indorser, or guarantor and has thus become "liable on" it.9 
These instruments, of course, may be involved in other types of 
actions, such as: an action for conversion of the instrument (section 
3-419); an action to recover damages for breach of the warranties of 
a collector or transferor (sections 3-417 and 4-207); an action to com-
pel indorsement (section 3-201); an action to enjoin payment (section 
5-114(2)(b)); or an action to obtain reformation, cancellation, or 
other redress. To the extent that the procedural provisions in section 
3-307 may be relevant in such actions-for example, the provisions 
4. In determining the scope of Article Three, one must start with the definition of 
"instrument" provided in § 3-102(l)(e) and then apply the exclusions and refinements 
found in§§ 3-103, 3-104 & 3-805. 
5. Certificates of deposit are within Article Three only if they contain "an engage• 
ment to repay" the acknowledged deposit. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(c). 
6. Section 8-102{l)(a) defines, in a highly functional manner, the instruments which 
may qualify as a "security" governed by Article 8. For a discussion of this definition, see 
Folk, Article Eight: A Premise and Three Problems, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1379-418 (1967). 
7. Comment to U.C.C. § 8-101. 
8. E.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-201, 8-202, 8-203, 8-205, 8-206 & 8-301 to -311. 
9. Section 3-401(1) provides that "no person is liable on an instrument unless his 
si1¥1ature appears thereon," (Emphasis added.) 
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in subsection (I) governing validity of signatures10-there appears 
to be no persuasive reason why they should not apply. In general, 
however, the language and purposes of section 3-307 contemplate 
actions by holders against signers to enforce the latter's liability to 
pay the instrument. 
Before discussing the specific procedural provisions, it will be 
helpful, as background for evaluating their significance and pur-
poses, to consider briefly the relationship between negotiable notes, 
checks, and drafts and the debts or other legal obligations which 
normally underlie such instruments, and to discuss the nature and 
basis of a holder's right to maintain an action on such an instrument 
to enforce payment by its signer. 
I. RELATION OF THE INSTRUMENT TO THE UNDERLYING 
OBLIGATION 
A negotiable note, check, or draft is usually issued or transferred 
either in connection with a concurrent contractual transaction be-
tween the signer and the holder or to evidence, secure, pay, or collect 
a pre-existing debt or other monetary obligation. These instruments 
were invented and developed by merchants and bankers11 to facili-
tate the transfer, collection, and payment of the monetary obligations 
which arose from commercial loans, deposits, or purchases of goods 
or services. Even though at present such paper is widely used by 
non-merchants, it still almost always represents underlying debts or 
other monetary obligations of the signers which result from con-
tractual or other legal commitments. Of course, an occasional note 
is issued for accommodation or to evidence a charitable subscription 
or other promise of gift, and checks are often issued as Christmas, 
birthday, or wedding presents, but these are insignificant in number 
in comparison with the millions of instruments issued every day12 
in connection with the creation, extension, transfer, or payment of 
legally binding obligations. 
Checks, drafts, and promissory notes, however, are not and do not 
purport to be simply written evidence of transactions or mere ac-
knowledgments of monetary obligations like I.O.U.'s or non-promis-
sory certificates of deposit. Rather, they are distinct and self-con-
tained monetary commitments or directives, serving separate and 
IO. See text accompanying note 59 infra. 
11. See generally HOLDEN, THE HlsrORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAw 
(1955). 
12. Presently, checks alone are being cleared at the rate of 70 million per day ac-
cording to Clarke, Check-Out Time for Checks, 83 J3ANKING L.J. 847 (1966), reprinted 
from 21 J3us. LAw. 931 (1966). 
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distinct commercial purposes. By expressing an unqualified promise 
or order to pay a specified sum, on demand or at a prescribed time, 
either to the bearer or to the order of a named person, they make 
the right to receive such payment expressly transferable, that is, 
"negotiable." Thus, the usual purpose of a negotiable promissory 
note or promissory certificate of deposit is not only to make explicit 
and definite the monetary commitment but also to split it off, in a 
sense, from the transaction or occasion that gave rise to it, and to 
put the commitment in such a form as to be readily and completely 
transferable by way of sale, discouy.t, pledge, or collection. Similarly, 
the usual purpose of a negotiable check or bank draft is to use one 
underlying obligation-the bank deposit debt owed to the drawer-
to pay another underlying obligation owed by the drawer-depositor 
to the payee by means of a payment directive by the drawer to the 
bank drawee, and to put this directive in transferable form in order 
to facilitate its cashing, its collection, or the making of a further 
payment through its indorsement and transfer by the payee. Finally, 
the purpose of a seller's negotiable draft on the buyer is not only to 
facilitate bank collection of payment for the goods sold but also, in 
many cases, to make possible the financing of the seller through 
discount of the draft. 
All of these instruments thus have financing or payment func-
tions distinct from the objectives of the underlying obligations and 
transactions in which they arise or on which they are based. In many 
cases, moreover, these functions could not readily be achieved by 
mere assignment of the underlying monetary claim, even if such 
claims had always been legally assignable. Therefore, ever since the 
days of the ancient law merchant, 13 our law, as eventually codified in 
the NIL and in Article Three of the Code, has recognized that such 
instruments embody separate obligations and that the holder-
simply by virtue of his holdership and of the form and terms of the 
instrument-has a legal right to receive payment and to discharge 
the obligations, 14 as well as a right to enforce the obligations by an 
action in his own name.15 Moreover, that law has prescribed, in 
considerable detail, the nature and extent of the primary or secon-
dary payment obligations of the maker,16 drawer,17 acceptor,1s and 
13. See generally MAI.YNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL, LEx MERCATORIA (1622); MARIUS, Ar,. 
VICE CONCERNING Bu.s OF EXCHANGE (3d ed. 1686). 
14. U.C.C. § 3-603; N.I.L. §§ 88 & 119. 
15. U.C.C. § 3-301; N.I.L. § 51. 
16. U.C.C. § 3-413(1); N.I.L. § 60. 
17. U.C.C. § 3-413(2}; N.I.L. § 61. 
18. U.C.C. § 3-413(1}; N.IL. § 62. 
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indorser19 to the holder in the event that the instrument is not paid 
when due or is dishonored;20 and has also established rules govern-
ing transfer and negotiation,21 the requirements for being a holder 
in due course,22 and the special rights of such a holder.23 
That these instruments embody rights and obligations distinct 
from those involved in the underlying obligation or transaction is 
clear when the holder is a subsequent transferee who is not a party 
to the issuance, or to a prior transfer, of the instrument and has not 
received an express assignment of the underlying claim.24 Yet even 
between the immediate parties-between the maker or drawer and 
the payee, or between an indorser and his immediate indorsee-the 
instrument constitutes a separate basis for claim and action since the 
instrument does not normally merge or replace the underlying 
obligation but rather creates asort of alter-ego obligation that co-
exists until one or the other is finally paid or satisfied. This has been 
clarified by the following new provision in the Code: 
Section 3-802, Effect of Instrument on Obligation for Which 
It Is Given. 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken 
for an underlying obligation 
(a) The obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is 
drawer, maker or acceptor of the instrument and 
there is no recourse on the instrument against the 
underlying obligor; and 
19. U.C.C. §§ 3-414 &: 3-415; N.I.L. §§ 64, 66 &: 67. 
20. There is a distinction between mere default in payment which subjects a maker 
or acceptor to liability under § 3-413(1) of the Code (§ 70 of the N.I.L.) for not paying 
a time note or draft when due even though payment has not been demanded, and dis-
honor by refusal or failure to pay or accept upon due presentment which results in 
drawer or indorser liability under §§ 3-413(2) &: 3-414 of the Code (§§ 61 &: 66 of the 
N.I.L.). Although a cause of action against the maker or acceptor/certifier of a demand 
instrument (other than a certificate of deposit) accrues, for purposes of the statute of 
limitations, on the date of issue {§ 3-122(I}(b) of the Code), such an instrument is not 
technically in default for purposes of damages until dishonor on demand. U.C.C. 
§ 3-122(4)(a). The rules governing presentment, dishonor, notice and protest are found 
in §§ 3-501 to -511 of the Code and in §§ 70-118 &: 143-160 of the N.I.L. 
21. U.C.C. §§ 3-201 to -207; N.I.L. §§ 30-50. 
22, U.C.C. §§ 3-302 to -304: N.I.L. §§ 52-56. 
23. U.C.C. § 3-305; N.I.L. § 57. 
24. Although under modem law the holder of an instrument may either negotiate 
it or explicitly assign to his transferee the holder's rights on the underlying monetary 
obligation (provided they are not personal to him), it is not clear whether the mere 
negotiation of the instrument carries with it an implied assignment of such holder's 
rights. See REsrATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs, §§ 148-77 (1932). There would appear to be no 
good reason why such an assignment should not be implied if there exists any need for 
an implication, but it is difficult to see how the transferee could derive any advantages 
from such an assignment beyond those rights which he acquires through the negotiation 
of the instrument. 
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(b) in any other case the obligation· is suspended pro 
tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable 
on demand until its presentment. If the instrument 
is dishonored action may be maintained on either the 
instrument or the obligation; discharge of the under-
lying obligqr_on the instrument also discharges him 
on the obliW<!tion. 
(2) The taking ingood faith of a check which is not post-
dated does not of itself so extend the time on the original obliga-
tion as to discharge a surety. 
In some instances, of course, commercial paper will be taken as 
an immediate satisfaction and discharge of the underlying obligation 
between the parties, as when an obligor obtains a cashier's check 
or a bank draft which is payable directly to his obligee and delivers 
it as a remitter without indorsing it.25 Immediate discharge may 
also occur when, in settlement of a disputed claim, the claimant 
agrees to take the other party's note for a specified amount as an 
accord and satisfaction.26 In most instances, however, the giving of 
the obligor's note for a debt, the issuance of his check in payment, 
or the indorsement and delivery of third-party paper by the obligor, 
as security for or in payment of the obligation, merely "suspends" 
the obligation until the instrument is due or presented.27 In such 
cases, the instrument is regarded either as representing or securing 
the obligation or as a conditional payment of it, and not as itself 
being a final payment or satisfaction.28 If the instrument is paid 
or the signer is otherwise discharged,29 his underlying obligation is 
also discharged pro tanto30 because the claim on the instrument is 
based upon and represents that obligation. If, however, the instru-
ment is not paid at maturity or is dishonored,31 the underlying obli-
gation remains unsatisfied and the obligee may either disregard the 
instrument and sue the obligor to enforce the original obligation, or, 
25. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(a). 
26. It has even been held that the mere receipt and retention for an unreasonable 
time of a check which has been tendered in satisfaction of a disputed claim will consti-
tute an accord and satisfaction. Curran v. Bray Wood Heel Co., 116 Vt. 21, 68 A.2d 712 
(1949); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 736 (1950). 
27. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(b). 
28. "Where payment is made by check drawn by a debtor on his banker, this is 
merely a mode of making a cash payment •••• Such payment is only conditional, or a 
means of obtaining the money." National Bank v. Chicago, B. &: N. RR., 44 Minn. 224, 
229, 46 N.W. 342, 344 (1890). 
29. The various ways in which a signer may be discharged from liability on an in• 
strument are catalogued in U.C.C. § 3-601. 
30. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(b). 
31. u.c.c. § 3-507. 
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as holder, sue on the instrument to enforce the obligor's liability as 
signer.32 When he chooses the latter course, the obligee has the proce-
dural advantages with which we are here concerned, since these ad-
vantages are for the benefit of any holder, or person having the rights 
of a holder under section 3-201 of the Code, regardless of whether 
he is a remote holder or the party with whom the signer dealt and to 
whom the underlying obligation is directly owed. Unlike most of the 
special privileges incident to the holdership of negotiable paper, the 
procedural advantages in suing on such paper are not restricted to 
that "most favored plaintiff in the law,"33 the holder in due course. 
II. THE PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 
Neither the NIL nor the Code attempts to prescribe comprehen-
sive rules of pleading and proof for actions on negotiable paper. In 
the main, such actions are governed either by the statutory procedural 
codes or by the rules of procedure which are generally applicable to 
civil actions in each jurisdiction.34 Thus, counsel must look to those 
codes or rules for answers to most of their procedural questions. 
Nevertheless, the NIL and the Code do contain the few special 
procedural rules which are discussed below. These rules, which have 
been developed over the years to expedite holders' actions, resulted 
from the unique financing and payment functions of negotiable pa-
per. To fulfill these functions, such paper must be as completely ac-
ceptable to creditors, obligees, and financers as is possible; and it will 
be so only if it is both easily collectable and readily marketable by 
the taker, that is, cashable, saleable, pledgeable, and discountable. 
Paper will not have these qualities in full measure unless it can be 
both enforced by holders without the burden of establishing the orig-
inal obligation and transferred to good faith takers for value free 
from most of the defenses and defects which may inhere in the obliga-
tion that exists between the original parties.35 The same policy con-
siderations-the need to facilitate and encourage the taking and free 
transferability of commercial paper-which underlie the preferred 
position of the holder in due course with respect to a signer's de-
fenses also require special procedural advantages for holders when it 
!12. U.C.C. § !1-802(l)(b). 
!l!I. An appellation frequently used by the late James Paige, formerly Professor of 
Law at the University of Minnesota, and my negotiable instruments teacher. 
!14. For a summary indicating which states have retained code procedure and which 
states have now adopted rules of civil procedure based on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, see I BARRON &: HOL'l'ZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Wright ed. 
1960) §§ 9-9.5!1 [hereinafter cited as BARRON &: HOL'l'ZOFF]. 
!15. U.C,C. § !1-305; N.I.L. § 57. 
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becomes necessary for them to institute an action to enforce a signer's 
obligations. Such an action will normally have to be brought in the 
signer's bailiwick, and, frequently, will be heard by a judge and jury 
who know the signer and who may be more sympathetic to his reasons 
for resisting payment than to the holder's right to receive payment.36 
In general, then, the special procedural provisions favor the plain-
tiff-holder: they greatly lighten and simplify his task of pleading and 
proving his cause of action; and they correspondingly increase the 
defendant-signer's burden of establishing a basis for avoiding or re-
ducing his payment obligation on the instrument. 
A. The NIL Provisions 
The procedural provisions in the NIL were stated in terms of 
certain matters being "prima fade" true or "presumed." Thus, for 
example, NIL section 16 provided that a valid and intentional deliv-
ery by a signer no longer in possession of the instrument was "pre-
sumed" conclusively as to a holder in due course. NIL section 24 
stated that "every negotiable instrument is deemed prima fade to 
have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person 
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for 
value."37 Section 59 of the NIL further provided that "every holder 
is deemed prima fade to be a holder in due course; but when it is 
shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument 
was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some 
person under whom he claims acquired the title as holder in due 
course. "38 
However, the NIL contained no definitions of "presumed," "pre-
sumption," or "prima fade" and thus left the precise meaning and 
procedural effect of these somewhat ambiguous terms39 for determi-
nation by each jurisdiction in accordance with its own rules and 
precedents concerning the effect of presumptions and prima fade 
evidence in general.40 This meant that, in application and effect, the 
36. This aspect of the procedural provisions is further elaborated in the text accom-
panying notes 123 & 124 infra. 
37. Under the NIL "absence or failure of consideration is matter of defense as 
against any person not a holder in due course •••• " N.I.L. § 28. 
38. The date on an instrument "is deemed prlma facie to be the true date." N.I.L. 
§ 11. "[E]very negotiation is deemed prima facie to have been effected before the instru-
ment was overdue" unless an indorsement is dated after maturity. N.I.L. § 45. "[E)very 
indorsement is presumed prlma facie to have been made at the place where the 
instrument is dated" unless the contrary is apparent. N.I.L. § 46. 
39. "One ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the 
family of legal terms, except its first cousin 'burden of proof' •.•• " McCORMICK, EVI· 
DENCE § 308, at 639 (1954). 
40. See generally, 1 JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 23-28 (2d ed. rev. 1926); McCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE §§ 308-17 (1954); THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 513-89 (1898); 
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NIL provisions lacked the uniformity desired of a uniform law. It is 
clear, of course, that under the NIL presumptions the holder always 
had the procedural advantages of not having to plead or introduce 
first proof on the following issues: the original delivery of a nego-
tiable instrument; the delivery by successive holders; the existence 
of consideration for a signer's obligation; the actual furnishing of 
that consideration; the status of the holder-plaintiff as a holder in due 
course.41 However, the NIL provided no uniform rules as to what 
showing or evidence a defendant-signer was required to present in 
order to rebut the presumptions or the prima facie inferences, and it 
did not indicate who had the ultimate burden of persuasion once 
conflicting evidence on any of these issues was before the court.42 
The Code, on the other hand, defines the meaning of "presump-
tion" and "presumed" with fair precision.43 As explained below, the 
procedural provisions in Article Three are phrased primarily in terms 
of pleading and proof rather than in terms of presumptions, but, 
where the term "presumption" is used, 44 its procedural meaning and 
effect are governed in all cases by the general Code definitions (uni-
formly construed, we hope) and are not left open for varying local 
interpretations. 
The NIL also did not provide presumptions or procedural rules 
with regard to the issue of the genuineness or authenticity of signa-
tures and indorsements on negotiable paper; thus, the questions of 
who had to raise this issue, how it could be raised, and who had the 
burdens of first proof and ultimate persuasion, were left for non-
uniform determination by each jurisdiction under its applicable 
procedural law.45 When the issue has been properly raised under local 
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2490-93 & 2499-540 (3d ed. 1940). The various conflicting views 
as to the nature, theory, and effect of presumptions have also been elaborated in numer-
ous law review articles. See, e.g., Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law 
Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); .Brosman, The Statutory Pre-
sumption, 5 TUL. L. REv. 178 (1931); Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REv. 391 
(1956); McBaine, Presumptions: Are They Evidence?, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 519 (1938); Mc-
Cormick, Charges on Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REv. 291 (1927); 
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv. 906 (1931). 
41. Comment, Burden of Proof of Due Course Holding Under Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, I IND. L.J. 49 (1926). 
42. For a general discussion of the NIL case law on these matters, see BRIITON, .BILLS 
AND NOTES §§ 102-05 (2d ed. 1961), 
43. " 'Presumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier of fact must find the existence 
of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a 
finding of its non-existence." U.C.C. § 1-201(31). For a comprehensive discussion of the 
problems concerning presumptions and evidence under the various code provisions, see 
I GA. L. REv. 44 (1966). 
44. See, e.g., § 3-114(3) with respect to dates; § 3-307(l)(b) with respect to genuineness 
and authenticity of signatures; and § 3-416(4) with respect to gnarantees. 
45. See notes 34 supra and 50 infra. 
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procedural law, the claimant generally has been held to have the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion as to the genuineness of the defendant's 
signature46 and of any indorsement which was necessary to the claim-
ant's rights as holder.47 As we shall see, the Code does not change this 
ultimate burden.48 Prior to the Code, however, there was no uniform-
ity under local procedural law as to how the issue of genuineness 
could be raised in the pleadings or as to who had the burden of first 
proof when the issue was raised. In many states there were no specific 
code or rule provisions governing these questions; thus, the answers 
depended upon judicial interpretation and the application of the 
relevant general provisions in each state's procedural code or rules.49 
Other states had specific statutory or rule provisions governing the 
pleading and proof of the genuineness of signatures on some or all 
written instruments. 50 These provisions varied greatly from state to 
state but need not be analyzed in detail since they have been largely 
superseded51 by sections 3-307(1) and 8-105(2)(a) and (b) of the Code, 
which are discussed below. Typically the state codes or rules provided 
that the validity of signatures on specified instruments would be 
deemed admitted, or prima facie established unless their validity was 
challenged by a prescribed denial under oath.112 The apparent ration-
46. In re Estate of Work, 212 Iowa 31, 233 N.W. 28 (1931); Engel v. Schloss, 134 Md. 
72, 106 Atl. 169 (1919); Hardison v. Jones, 196 N.C. 712, 146 S.E. 804 (1929); Niles v. 
Rexford, 105 Vt. 492, 168 Atl. 714 (1933). 
47. Whitman v. Fournier, 228 Mass. 93, 117 N.E. 3 (1917); Van Syck.el v. Egg Harbor 
Coal &: Lumber Co., 109 N.J.L. 604, 162 Atl. 627 (1932); Lycoming Trust Co. v. Allen, 
102 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 156 Atl. 707 (1931). 
The issue of genuineness is essential to plaintiff's cause of action because "no person 
is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon •••. " (N.I.L. § 18; 
accord, U.C.C. § 3-401) and forged or unauthorized signatures are "wholly inoperative." 
N.I.L. § 23; U.C.C. § 3-404. Additionally, a valid indorsement is necessary to the nego-
tiation and subsequent holdership of order paper, and in order to sue on an instru-
ment under § 3-301, one must be a holder. N.I.L. § 51; U.C.C. § 3-301. For the defini-
tion of holder, see note 3 supra. Holdership of order paper by a person other than the 
named payee requires the valid indorsement of the payee (and of his and successive 
special indorsees, if any). N.I.L. §§ 30, 31, 33 &: 34; U.C.C. §§ 3-202 &: 3-204. 
48. U.C.C. § 3-307(I)a. 
49. Lack of uniformity in the relevant provisions of the various state procedural 
codes and rules renders futile or misleading any attempt to generalize from the deci-
sions on these issues. Determination on a state-by-state basis is necessary. 
50. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c.110, § 34 (1963); MINN STAT. § 600.15 (1961); N.J. REv. 
STAT. § 2:98-3 (1937); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 328.25-.26; Mich. Gen. Ct. R. 602 (1963); Iowa 
R. Civ. P. 100 &: 102 (1943). 
51. Where these provisions applied only to negotiable instruments, they have gener-
ally been repealed upon adoption of the Code. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 328.26 (1958). 
On the other hand, where they applied to all written instruments, they have occasionally 
been amended in order to conform to the Code provisions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 600.15 (1965). 
52. Representative was the Minnesota statutory provision which provided in perti-
nent part that: 
In actions brought on promissory notes or bills of exchange by the endorsee the 
possession of the note or bill shall be prima facie evidence that the same w~ en-
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ale for such provisions was that, since the task of proving the genuine-
ness or authenticity of another's signature may be difficult, 53 and since 
most signatures are genuine or authorized, a plaintiff should not be 
required to establish the validity of a signature unless the defendant 
appropriately demonstrated that a real issue of genuineness was in-
volved.64 
B. The Code Provisions 
In keeping with the policy, which is evidenced throughout Arti-
cle Three, of eliminating the unnecessary NIL provisions and con-
densing, rewording, and consolidating the remaining rules as much 
as possible, the draftsmen of the Code have attempted to state in one 
section, section 3-307, the procedural effect of the former NIL pre-
sumptions and prima fade provisions relating to delivery, considera-
tion, and holders in due course. 55 In addition, section 3-307 contains 
new procedural provisions on the validity of signatures and on de-
fenses in general. The section reads as follows: 
Section 3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures, Defenses and 
Due Course. 
(I) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature 
on an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a 
signature is put in issue 
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming 
under the signature; but 
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized 
except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a 
purported signer who has died or become incompetent be-
fore proof is required. 
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of 
the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the 
defendant establishes a defense. 
dorsed by the person by whom it purports to be endorsed. Every written instru-
ment purporting to have been signed or executed by any person shall be proof that 
it was so signed or executed until such person shall deny the signature or execution 
of the same by his oath or affidavit; but this shall not extend to instruments pur-
porting to have been signed or executed by a person who has died before the re-
quirement of such proof. 
MINN, STAT, § 600.15 (1961). 
53. Where plaintiff or his witnesses were not present when the signature was made 
so that they are unable to testify as to who made it, the genuineness of the signature 
will have to be established by a comparison with available genuine specimens, if any, 
and perhaps by testimony of handwriting experts or by other means. Proof of agency 
and authority to sign when signatures purport to be signed by an agent will of course 
be difficult and burdensome in many instances. 
54. See comment I to U.C.C. § 3-307. 
55. N.I.L. §§ 16, 24, 28 &: 59. 
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(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the 
rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establish-
ing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all 
respects a holder in due course. 
Except for the presumption in subsection (l)(b), these provisions do 
not purport to set up presumptions; rather, they prescribe direct pro-
cedural requirements as to who must plead and who must "establish" 
various facts on which liability or recovery depend. 
The Code avoids using the traditional terms "proof," "proved," 
and "burden of proof," because of their tendency to confuse the ques-
tion of who has the burden of producing first evidence of a fact with 
the question of who has the burden of ultimate persuasion as to that 
fact. Instead, the Code employs in this and other sections the terms 
"establish," "established," "shown," and a new phrase, "burden of 
establishing." The latter is defined in section 1-201(8) as "the burden 
of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more 
probable than its nonexistence." The words "establish" and "estab-
lished" are not separately defined, but apparently are to be inter-
preted as denoting the introduction of a sufficient quantum of evi-
dence on a fact to satisfy the "burden of establishing" that fact. The 
term "shown," however, is used in section 3-307(3), but is not defined 
anywhere; thus, the question is raised as to whether "shown" means 
shown by pleading (or by admission) or evidence, and if the latter, 
whether by any evidence or by a quantum sufficient to "establish" 
the fact. It is reasonable to assume that the draftsmen used "shown" 
merely as a synonym for "established" or "admitted," but since the 
term is susceptible of different meanings, it either should not have 
been used or should have been defined and clarified. 
The Code's changes in terminology have been criticized as an un-
warranted departure from familiar and traditional procedural lan-
guage;56 however, the ambiguities in "proof" and "burden of proof" 
seem to justify the use of novel terminology as an attempt at clarifi-
cation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the new terms, in 
the context in which they are used in section 3-307 and other Code 
provisions, will achieve the desired clarity or merely create new ambi-
guities. We can only hope that knowledge of the old ambiguities will 
provide incentive for a uniform interpretation of the new terms or 
will lead to amendments clarifying the Code's terminology. 
Subsection (I) of section 3-307 requires that the party (normally 
56. Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law With Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 
Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 446-50 (1954). 
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the defendant) who desires to challenge the validity of his purported 
signature on the instrument (or of an indorsement or other signature 
necessary to his liability in the action) must raise the issue by a spe-
cific denial in his pleading.57 Otherwise, validity is admitted. Once 
the issue is thus raised, subsection (l)(a) places the ultimate burden 
of persuasion on the party (usually the holder-plaintiff) whose 
rights depend upon the signature's validity; however, by subsection 
(l)(b), such party has the benefit of a presumption of validity except 
in the specified cases of dead or incompetent signers. This means, 
under the Code definition of "presumption" in section 1-201(31), 
that he will prevail unless the party challenging the signature "intro-
duces evidence which would support a finding" of non-validity. In 
other words, the challenging party must first specifically raise the 
issue in his pleading and then introduce evidence sufficient to war-
rant a finding that the signature was not authorized or genuine before 
the party claiming under the signature is given the task of going for-
ward and sustaining his burden of persuading the trier of fact that 
validity is more probable than invalidity. 
Subsection (2) of section 3-307 is something of a masterpiece of 
condensation and, arguably, of understatement. This one short sen-
tence not only purportedly indicates, largely by implication, what 
matters the defendant has the burden of pleading and establishing as 
"defenses" in order to reduce or avoid liability, but it also assumes 
or ignores some facts that the plaintiff-holder must plead and prove 
in order to establish a cause of action and a right of recovery against 
certain signers. 
The phrase "unless the defendant establishes a defense" seems 
clearly to imply that defendant must plead, introduce first evidence, 
and carry the ultimate burden of persuasion as to any matter that 
constitutes a "defense" other than signature validity, since subsection 
(2) contains no provisions like those in subsection (1) which divide 
the burdens in the case of signature defenses. What constitutes a "de-
fense" for purposes of subsection (2) presumably must be determined 
from other provisions in Article Three. For example, section 
3-305(2) specifically labels as "defenses" infancy, other incapacity, 
57. The purpose of requiring a specific denial is to apprise the other party that he 
must answer to a claim of forgery or lack of authority to sign. See comment 1 to § 3-307. 
The phrase "unless specifically denied in the pleadings" leaves room, of course, for tech-
nical interpretations as to what constitutes a sufficient specific denial under the codes 
or rules governing pleading in the particular jurisdiction in which the action is brought. 
See, e.g., Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77 
(D.C. Mass. 1940), in which the court held that defendant's denial of execution of a 
writing was sufficiently specific under the Federal Rules although possibly not suffi-
ciently specific under a Massachusetts statute requiring specific denial of execution. 
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nullifying illegality, fraud in the essence, and the rest of the so-called 
"real" defenses that may be asserted even against a holder in due 
course. Section 3-306 lists as "defenses" a number of so-called "per-
sonal'' defenses that can be asserted against one who is not a holder 
in due course, including: "want or failure of consideration, non-per-
formance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a 
special purpose .... "58 Finally, section 3-407, which deals with al-
terations and their effect upon liability, provides in subsection (2) 
that "as against any person other than a subsequent holder in due 
course (a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and mate-
rial discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed unless 
that party assents or is precluded from asserting the defense .... "59 
It thus seems clear that the Code, through section 3-307 (2) and these 
various "defense" provisions in other sections, has retained the pro-
cedural effect of the NIL presumptions as to delivery and considera-
tion simply by requiring a defendant to establish all "defenses." 
The first phrase in section 3-307 (2)-"when signatures are ad-
mitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder 
to recover on it .... "-may be misleading since it either presup-
poses or ignores a number of things, in addition to mere "production 
of the instrument," that a plaintiff may need to establish in his case 
in chief before he is entitled to recover on the instrument from the 
particular signer being sued. The phrase assumes that the plaintiff is 
the holder, or has the rights of the holder, 60 and that this fact has 
either been admitted by the defendant or established by the plain-
tiff's evidence of his possession of the instrument as the named payee 
or indorsee, or as bearer61 or transferee. It also presupposes that the 
facts necessary to the liability of, and to the accrual of a cause of 
action62 against, the particular defendant-signer have been admitted, 
58. Section 3-408 also specifies that want or failure of consideration is a defense. 
59. (Emphasis added.) This indicates that a defendant's assertion that the terms of 
an instrument have been altered or are incorrect is "a defense" that he must establish 
under section 3-307(2). The pre-Code decisions concerning how a defendant must plead 
alteration and who must offer first proof and/or carry the burden of ultimate persuasion 
on that issue were almost as diverse and confusing as those dealing with signature 
validity. E.g., compare Farmers' Loan &: Trust Co. v. Siefke, 144 N.Y. 354, 39 N.E. 358 
(1895), with Fudge v. Marquell, 164 Ind. 447, 72 N.E. 565, afj'd on rehearing, 73 N.E. 
895 (1905). 
60. Under § 3·201, one may acquire the rights of a holder by transfer without nego-
tiation and thus be entitled to enforce payment although not a holder in one's own 
right. Comment 2 to § 3-307 indicates that such a non-holder transferee, by proving the 
transfer, is entitled to recover under subsection (2). 
61. " 'Bearer' means the person in possession of an instrument, document of title, or 
security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank." U.C.C. § 1-201(5). 
62. U.C.C. § 3-122, a new section with no counterpart in the NIL, spells out when a 
cause of action accrues against various signers of the instruments governed by Article 
Three. 
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are shown by the terms of the instrument, or have been established 
by the plaintiff's evidence. If the defendant has signed as maker, ac-
ceptor, or certifier and is thus primarily liable to pay the instrument 
when due63 and without demand, 64 the instrument itself will presum-
ably show that it is overdue and that the plaintiff is thus entitled to 
recover on it from such signer. However, if the instrument is a certi-
ficate of deposit on which the cause of action against the issuing bank 
does not accrue until demand for payment and refusal, 65 then, in ad-
dition to production of the instrument, both demand and refusal 
must be admitted by the defendant or established by the plaintiff's 
evidence. Moreover, if the defendant-signer is a drawer or an indorser 
whose secondary liability66 depends upon due presentment,67 dis-
honor,68 notice,69 and in some cases protest70 (or waiver or excuse 
thereof), 71 production of the instrument by the plaintiff must be ac-
companied by appropriate evidence of these facts72 unless they too 
are admitted. Finally, if the defendant signed as a guarantor of pay-
ment or collection,73 the conditions necessary to his liability in that 
capacity must appear, be established by the plaintiff, or be admitted. 
Obviously, then, in many cases the holder will not be able to es-
tablish his right "to recover" from a particular signer simply by "pro-
duction of the instrument." Section 3-307(2) would convey a clearer 
understanding of the plaintiff's procedural burdens if it contained 
some additional language indicating that recovery by a holder de-
pends upon his production of the instrument plus the defendant's 
admission or the holder's establishment of such additional facts as are 
necessary to establish the liability of, and a cause of action againt, the 
particular signer being sued. 
63. u.c.c. §§ 3-413(1) 8: 3-411(1). 
64. U.C.C. § 3-501, which prescribes when presentment (defined as a "demand" in 
§ 3-504) is necessary to charge parties with liability, applies only to secondary parties, 
not to makers, acceptors, or certifiers. 
65. u.c.c. § 3-122(2). 
66. u.c.c. §§ 3-413(2) 8: 3-414. 
67. u.c.c. §§ 3-503 8: 3-504. 
68. u.c.c. § 3-507. 
69. u.c.c. § 3-508. 
70. u.c.c. § 3-509. 
71. u.c.c. § 3-511. 
72. U.C.C. § 3-510 provides that a certificate of protest, or a bank's dishonor stamp, 
ticket, or regular book or record showing dishonor, "are admissible as evidence and 
create a presumption of dishonor and of any notice of dishonor therein shown." This is 
a new provision, not derived from the NIL, which greatly simplifies proof of the holder's 
case in chief against drawers and indorsers. 
73. U.C.C. § 3-416, another new provision in the Code, spells out the nature and 
terms of the obligations of parties who sign instruments as guarantors of payment 
or collection. 
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Subsection (3) of section 3-307 is applicable only in cases in which 
the parties were not immediate parties to the instrument: when the 
plaintiff did not take the instrument directly from the defendant-
signer but rather acquired it from a remitter or an intervening holder. 
If the plaintiff in such cases took the instrument as a holder in due 
course,74 or, in some cases, from a holder in due course,75 he is en-
titled to recover against the signer free from claims and defenses 
other than the so-called "real" defenses.76 Thus, if the defendant-
signer has shown that a defense exists by his pleading and by intro-
ducing evidence, and if such defense is a "personal" defense not avail-
able against a holder in due course, 77 the plaintiff may wish to avoid 
it on the basis that "he or some person under whom he claims is in 
all respects a holder in due course." Subsection (3) places on the 
plaintiff the burden of establishing his status as a holder in due 
course-he must introduce evidence on all aspects of his status78 and 
ultimately persuade the trier of £act on this issue. This is essentially 
the rule in the first sentence of section 59 of the NIL,79 but the Code 
rule is stated in terms of a direct procedural requirement rather than 
in terms of a prima fade status and is clarified by the elimination of 
the "title ... defective" language which had led some courts to make 
a technical distinction between defenses which made a negotiator's 
title defective under NIL section 55 and those which did not.80 
The above analysis of section 3-307 reveals that, despite the Code's 
change in approach and wording, it gives the holder of commercial 
paper the same basic procedural advantages in suing on the instru-
ment that he enjoyed under the NIL presumptions. Moreover, the 
Code gives the holder some additional advantages, borrowed from 
non-uniform statutes, in establishing the validity of signatures. Cer-
tainly the Code's method of stating the procedural rules is more di-
rect and, in many respects, is clearer and more definite than was the 
NIL approach, and the Code therefore should achieve greater uni-
formity in application. There still exists some room for improvement 
and further clarification, however, if misunderstanding and conflict-
ing interpretations of section 3-307 are to be avoided. 
74. u.c.c. §§ 3-302, 3-303 & 3-304. 
75. U.C.C. § 3-201 and comment 3 thereon. 
76. u.c.c. § 3-305. 
77. Id. 
78. See comment 3 to U.C.C. § 3-307. 
79. "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when it 
is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, 
the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims 
acquired the title as holder in due course." 
80. See l3RITION, l3ILIS & NOTES 355-60 (2d ed. 1961). 
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROCEDURAL RULEs---SOME 
COMPARISONS 
The full significance of the Code rules in section 3-307 and the ex-
tent of the holder's resulting procedural advantages become apparent 
only by comparing his burdens in an action on the instrument with 
his burdens as a plaintiff in an ordinary action for breach of contract 
based upon the underlying transaction in which the instrument was 
issued or transferred. The remainder of this discussion is, therefore, 
devoted to such a comparison in the setting of a simple contract-for-
sale transaction. 
A. The Transaction 
B contracts to buy a power-mower from S for $200. This may be 
a cash deal in which B agrees to pay the $200 to S on delivery of the 
mower, or it may be a credit deal with payment to be made, either 
in full or in installments, at some specified future time or times. 
Upon delivery of the mower in the cash deal, or when the deferred 
payment comes due in the credit deal, B may, of course, make pay-
ment in money. It is more likely, however, that B will tender and S 
will take either B's own check payable to S's order or, perhaps, B's 
paycheck or other third-party check or draft indorsed by B to S. Pos-
sibly, B will give Sa bank money order, a cashier's check, or a bank 
draft which is payable directly to the order of S as payee and which 
B has purchased for this transaction and does not sign or indorse. 
In this last case, as was noted above, S's taking of the unindorsed 
bank paper is considered final payment, like the receipt of money, 
and discharges B's $200 contractual obligation to S.81 However, when 
S takes B's own check or indorsed third-party paper, this merely 
"suspends" the contractual obligation pending the final payment or 
dishonor of the instrument. 82 In the credit deal, of course, S may re-
quire, upon delivery of the mower, that B sign as maker, and issue to 
S as payee, a negotiable promissory note for the $200 plus interest, 
payable at such future time as is specified in the contract. Such a note 
also merely "suspends" the underlying obligation until it is finally 
paid or dishonored, and the note may be secured by an additional 
accommodation signature83 or by S retaining a "security interest"84 in 
81. U.C.C. § 3-802(I)a, quoted in text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. 
82. U.C.C. § 3-802(I)b • .B may, of course, buy and make payment with a postal 
money order, commercial traveler's check, or other non-bank payment paper on which 
S may have no recourse against .B if the paper is dishonored; but such payment ap-
parently comes within § 3-802(I)b and merely "suspends" the contract obligation. 
83. u.c.c. § 3-415. 
84. Defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(37). 
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the mower through a conditional sale or other security agreement85 
with B. 
When S takes commercial paper, he may retain the beneficial 
ownership of it, transferring and indorsing it to his bank as only a 
holder-agent for collection.86 Alternatively, if S needs funds imme-
diately, he may transfer both holdership and beneficial ownership 
by indorsing and cashing the check, by drawing against it pending 
collection, 87 by making a payment with it to a third party, or by sell-
ing, discounting, or pledging the note. In any case, if the instrument 
is paid or otherwise satisfied or discharged, both B's obligation on it 
as a signer and his underlying $200 contractual obligation are dis-
charged. 88 
For our purposes, however, assume that B claims fraud by S or 
that the mower was never delivered or was defective and was returned 
to S, and that B refuses to pay the note or stops payment on the check. 
In such a case, the Code provides that "if the instrument is dishon-
ored action may be maintained on either the instrument or the obli-
gation .... "89 Therefore, if S still owns the instrument or has taken 
it up from a subsequent holder following dishonor and thus has re-
acquired rights as a holder,90 and if S disputes B's claim concerning 
the mower, S has an option either to sue B for breach of the contract 
or to bring suit on the instrument. 
In either case, of course, S as plaintiff has the burden, in his plead-
ing and proof, of establishing B's legal obligation to pay him $200. 
Also, since S dealt directly with B, S cannot be a holder in due course 
as to Band, if S sues on the instrument, B can set up all the defenses 
he could have asserted if S had sued for breach of contract.91 Of 
course, in either action the full burden of pleading and establishing 
all of the so-called "affirmative defenses" such as payment, misrepre-
sentation, breach of warranty, statute of frauds, and others, is on the 
defendant B.92 Nevertheless, it is still to S's advantage to sue Bon the 
instrument because the establishment of B's basic obligation and 
liability is much more simple in such an action than in the contract 
action. Moreover, if the instrument is no longer owned by S but has 
85. Defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(l)h. The validity, perfection, priority, and enforce-
ment of such a security agreement is governed by the provisions in Article Nine of the 
Code. 
86. See U.C.C. § 4-201. 
87. In which case the bank acquires a security interest in the paper under U.C.C. 
§ 4-208. 
88. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)b. 
89. Id. 
90. See U.C.C. §§ 3-208 &: 3-603(2). 
91. u.c.c. § 3-306. 
92. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 610-18 (2d ed. 1947). 
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been negotiated to a bank or other subsequent holder, it is obviously 
much simpler for the subsequent holder to establish B's liability on 
the instrument than to establish a cause of action as an ordinary 
assignee of S's contractual claim against B. 
B. The Action for Breach of Contract 
If S elects to sue B for the $200 price of the mower on the basis of 
B's breach of the contract rather than on the instrument, S's com-
plaint under the fact pleading of the procedural codes93 must contain 
appropriate allegations showing the elements of his cause of action:94 
the making and the terms of the contract between Sand B; the fur-
nishing of consideration (the power mower) to B; the fulfillment of 
any other conditions precedent to B's obligation to pay the $200; and 
B's breach.95 Under rule procedure, of course, the pleading in a com-
plaint for breach of contract is simplified, but S must still show the 
basis on which he is entitled to relief.96 
B, in his responsive pleading, can put in issue the basic facts con-
tained in the complaint by general or specific denial.97 To the extent 
that B puts these facts in issue, S has not only the burden of intro-
ducing first evidence of such facts but also the ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact.98 Thus, except as admitted by B, S has 
the full burden of establishing the making and the terms of the con-
tract, his own performance and fulfillment of conditions precedent, 
B's breach, and S's damages. Of course, if there is a writing purport-
edly signed by B which evidences the contract, S may have a statutory 
presumption in his favor as to the writing's validity,99 or there may 
be no dispute as to that issue, so that S may have no difficulty in estab-
lishing the existence and terms of the contract. Yet he still has the 
burden of persuasion as to the other three elements of his action, and 
the real controversy between S and B is frequently over these matters. 
If S has sold and delivered the mower to B on credit without tak-
ing a note and has then sold or otherwise assigned the account to a 
bank or finance company, and if S is not in a position to reimburse 
the assignee when B defaults, the assignee may have to sue B for 
93. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 92, at 22-23, 225-39; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 620-28 
(5th ed. 1929). 
94. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 92, at 127-46; POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 93, at 
628-67. See generally Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924). 
95. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 92, at 276-86. 
96. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) 8: (e), 9(c) and Appendix of Forms 5; IA .BARRON 8: 
HOLTZOFF § 259, 
97. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 92, at 581-97; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b) 8: 9(c). 
98. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 635-39 (1954). 
99. See, e.g., MINN, STAT, § 600.15 (1961), quoted in note 52 supra. 
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breach of the contract. In such an action, the assignee-plaintiff not 
only has the same burden of pleading and proof that S would have as 
plaintiff in the contract action, but also has the full burden of plead-
ing and establishing both a valid assignment by S to the plaintifE1°0 
and the latter's right, as the real party in interest, to sue B.101 
C. The Action on the Instrument by S 
If S chooses to sue B "on the instrument"-as maker of the dis-
honored note, drawer of the dishonored check, or indorser of the dis-
honored third-party paper-S still has the basic procedural burden of 
establishing B's obligation and liability to him. However, S's mere 
possession of the instrument, which is negotiable in form, purport-
edly signed by B, and payable by its terms or indorsements to S or to 
bearer, enables S to satisfy that burden with a minimum of plead-
ing and proof. 
In an action on the note, S's complaint must both allege that B 
signed or executed the note in question as maker and show the terms 
of the note usually by setting them out in haec verba.102 Thus, the 
complaint will disclose that the note is negotiable in form, that the 
date for payment is past and that the note is thus overdue, and that 
S is the payee named in the note and is thus entitled to payment by 
its terms.103 There is no need to allege presentment and dishonor, 
since, as maker, B is primarily obligated to pay at maturity without 
demand.104 
If, however, the action is against B as drawer of the check or as 
indorser of third-party paper, S's complaint should allege, and in any 
event S must prove (in addition to the terms of the instrument, B's 
signing, and S's holdership), either the due presentment of the instru-
ment to the drawee, its dishonor by the drawee, and any required 
protest or notice of dishonor to B, or facts constituting an excuse for 
non-fulfillment of these prerequisites to the secondary liability of 
drawers and indorsers.105 
S's complaint in either of the above actions, however, need not 
allege how or under what circumstances the note, check, or draft was 
signed by B, that there was a contract for the sale of the power mower, 
100. REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 148-51 (1932); U.C.C. § 2-210(2) &: (3). 
101. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 92, at 155, 163-66, 171-72; FED. R. CIV. P. 17; 2 
BARRON&: HOLTZOFF § 482, at 14-19. 
102. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. S(e) and Appendix of Forms 3. 
103. The complaint will also demand judgment for the face amount plus interest 
from maturity. See, e.g., FED. R. Cxv. P. 8(a)(3) and Appendix of Forms 3. 
104. See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
105. See text accompanying notes 66-72 supra. 
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that there was any consideration for B's signature, or that he received 
the mower. All of these matters involve "defenses" which B must 
establish.106 The mere fact that S, a payee or holder, possesses overdue 
or dishonored negotiable paper, which has been signed by B, and 
which unconditionally promises or orders payment of a specified 
amount of money on demand or at a definite time to the bearer or to 
a specified person, is deemed sufficient to raise a presumption that the 
signer is liable to the holder. This presumption is not just a peculiar 
quirk of mercantile law; rather, it is based upon the obvious fact that 
negotiable paper is almost always issued or transferred in order to 
evidence, pay, or collect legal debts or other monetary obligations.107 
It is also founded upon the strong inference that, if the instrument is 
still in the possession of a holder, the legal obligation has not yet been 
satisfied. These commercial realities together with the policy of en-
couraging the transfer of negotiable paper justify placing upon sign._ 
ers the burden of establishing the absence of a legal obligation108 and 
the resulting procedural advantages to holders. 
In B's responsive pleading, then, a general denial merely puts into 
issue the existence of the alleged instrument and S's possession as a 
holder. B must specifically plead invalidity of signatures if he claims 
that defense,109 just as he must plead any of the ordinary "affirmative 
defenses" to contractual liability.11° Furthermore, even if B claims 
that he never consummated a binding contract with S, that he either 
never received the power mower or rejected it as defective, or that 
he never delivered the instrument to S or only delivered it condition-
ally, B must raise these issues in his pleading since "want or failure of 
consideration is a defense ... ,"111 as is "non-performance of any 
condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special pur-
pose .... "112 
At trial, S's case in chief is very simple. He merely has to pro-
duce the instrument showing B's purported signature, testify that 
he (S) is the named payee, the indorsee, or the possessor (if the instru-
ment is indorsed in blank or otherwise payable to bearer), and intro-
duce it in evidence. If the action is against B as drawer or indorser, 
rather than as maker, S also must introduce evidence of due present-
ment, dishonor, and so forth, or evidence showing excuse of those 
106. See text accompanying notes 58 & 59 supra. 
107. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra. 
108. u.c.c. § !l-!107(2). 
109. u.c.c. § !1-!107(1). 
llO. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
Ill. U.C.C. § !l-408. 
112. U.C.C. § !1-!106. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 9(c). 
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prerequisites.113 From this point on, the onus is upon B. He must in-
troduce first proof of the invalidity of signatures even though S there-
after has the burden of establishing their effectiveness,114 and, as to 
all other matters, B has the full burden of first proof and ultimate 
persuasion. 
D. The Action on the Instrument by a Subsequent Holder 
If S has indorsed and negotiated the instrument to a subsequent 
holder for value and then is unavailable or unable to take up the in-
strument when it is dishonored,115 the holder normally will seek pay-
ment from B as maker, drawer, or prior indorser and may sue B on 
the instrument to enforce payment. In such an action, the allegations 
in the subsequent holder's complaint and the evidence necessary to 
establish his case in chief as holder will be essentially the same as 
when S sues as holder of the instrument. The plaintiff's holdership 
will rest upon the indorsement of S and, possibly, upon an interme-
diate indorsement if there has been more than one negotiation; how-
ever, as already explained, the validity of an indorsement is presumed 
and the holder does not have to show how he acquired the instrument 
or that he took as a holder in due course "unless the defendant estab-
lishes a defense."mi If the defense, although established, is one that 
is not available against a holder in due course, the plaintiff may avoid 
it and recover the amount of the instrument by introducing evidence 
that will sustain his "burden of establishing that he or some person 
under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course."117 
The typical plaintiff-either a merchant who has cashed B's check, or 
a bank or finance company which has advanced funds against B's 
check or has purchased B's note-normally will have little difficulty 
in proving his status as a holder in due course by presenting convinc-
ing evidence that the instrument was taken for appropriate value in 
the ordinary course of business, in good faith, and without notice of 
the facts of the S-B transaction or of B's personal defenses. B, on the 
other hand, may have some difficulty in adducing evidence sufficient 
to negate the existence of any of these requirements. 
Even though B has pleaded a defense, the plaintiff-holder may 
wait until B establishes the defense before attempting to avoid it by 
113. See text accompanying notes 63-72 supra. 
114. U.C.C. § 3-307(1)b. 
115. Normally the subsequent holder will seek recourse from his transferor-indorser 
when the instrument "bounces" and will look to prior parties only when such recourse 
is unobtainable. 
116. u.c.c. § 3-307(2). 
117. u.c.c. § 3-307(3). 
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presenting proof of his status as a holder in due course. However, 
when the plaintiff has clear evidence that he took as a holder in due 
course, it will usually be tactically advantageous for him to introduce 
that evidence in his case in chief. If the plaintiff can show at the out-
set by clear and convincing evidence, which is unshaken on cross-
examination, that he took as a holder in due course, that issue will 
not usually be sufficiently doubtful to require submission to the jury 
unless B introduces rebutting evidence. Thus, when B starts to put 
in his evidence, the plaintiff can object to any proof of B's personal 
defenses against S, until B introduces credible evidence that casts 
doubt upon the plaintiff's status as a holder in due course, since per-
sonal defenses are irrelevant if the plaintiff is conclusively shown to 
be such a holder.118 If B has no evidence sufficient to make a jury 
issue of the holder in due course question, he can be blocked from 
showing his defense and plaintiff probably can get a directed ver-
dict.119 This procedure avoids the time-consuming, and in these cir-
cumstances unnecessary, process of introducing extensive evidence as 
to the transaction between S and B and as to the facts of the defense. 
Moreover, if discovery procedures120 are properly used, it may be 
possible to obtain a summary judgment121 for the plaintiff and thus 
avoid a trial entirely. 
Finally, introducing evidence of his holder in due course status 
in his case in chief may protect the plaintiff's substantive rights in the 
following type of situation. Frequently B's defense is based upon out-
right fraud or other sharp dealings by S. If B is an individual con-
sumer or even a small local merchant being sued for the price of a 
worthless product or one that he never received from S, it may seem 
very unjust to a judge and jury in his locality122 to require him to 
pay the check or note which he was duped into signing, particularly 
if the plaintiff-holder is a large bank or finance company doing busi-
ness in another city. That plaintiff is a holder in due course and that 
the policies underlying the law of negotiable paper require payment 
to such holders by signers like B in order to facilitate the use of such 
paper will not weigh heavily with a judge and jury of B's peers once 
the facts of S's conduct are before them. If the plaintiff waits until 
BB. See M &: M Securities Co. v. Dirnberger, 190 Minn. 57, 250 N.W. 801 (1933); 
Kipp v. Welsh, 141 Minn. 291, 170 N.W. 222 (1918). 
ll9. See BrurroN, BILLS &: NoTES 265-68 (2d ed. 1961) for discussion and analysis of 
the cases on plaintiff's right to a directed verdict in this situation. 
120. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30-37. 
121. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 56. 
122. Normally the venue of the action will be defendant J3's locality. See, e.g., 28 
u.s.c. § 1391 (1964). 
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B's sordid story is told before proving his innocent taking of the 
paper, his evidence may at that point seem sufficiently inconclusive 
to the judge to require submission of the holder in due course issue 
to the jury despite the absence of any substantial rebutting evi-
dence.123 Moreover, the jury, despite proper instructions, may well 
doubt that the plaintiff was wholly unaware of S's wrongdoing and 
may find in B's favor.124 Thus, counsel for a plaintiff bank or :finance 
company that clearly took the paper as a holder in due course should 
try to avoid the situation just described by establishing the plaintiff's 
due course status as conclusively as possible in his case in chief. This 
should not result in any unfairness to the defendant, since he should 
be able on cross-examination to bring out any weaknesses in the 
plaintiff's claimed due course status. In addition, if there are no 
weaknesses-if the plaintiff is unquestionably a holder in due course 
-he is entitled to protection against the possible misguided sympa-
thies of a hostile jury. 
Court procedure should aid, not hamper, the policies deemed 
necessary to the effective working of our payment and :financing sys-
tem as embodied in the rights of holders in due course. It must be 
remembered, that a recovery by the holder in due course from B 
free from B's personal defenses merely means that B must seek 
redress from S, the person who swindled him, just as he would 
have had to do if he had paid cash to S. The risk that S might be 
judgment-proof or unavailable should be borne by B, who dealt with 
S, rather than by the good faith holder who cashed, discounted, or 
otherwise took B's commercial paper for value in the ordinary course 
of business or :financing without notice of S's wrongdoing. One who 
signs and issues or transfers negotiable paper invites merchants, bank-
ers, and others who do business with such instruments to deal with 
the paper in the customary fashion. When they do so in good faith 
and without notice of anything amiss, the signer should not expect 
them to bear the burden of his failure to get the deal he bargained 
for. They assume the risks of his capacity, his credit, and of the genu-
ineness of the paper.125 He should bear the other risks. 
123. See, e.g., Amd v. Aylesworth, 145 Iowa 185, 123 N.W. 1000 (1909). 
124. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Kirk, 85 Ind. App. 120, 134 N.E. 772 (1922); 
Rohweder v. Titus, 85 Wash. 441, 148 P. 583 (1915). 
125. u.c.c. §§ 3-305(2) & 3-404(1). 
